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I.

INTRODUCTION

In many chapter I1 reorganization proceedings, the reduction of claims through the claims objection and estimation pro* Menachem 0. Zelmanovitz is a member of the firm of Zalkin, Rodin & Goodman in New York City and specializes in the fields of bankruptcy, creditors' rights
and commercial litigation.
Elana C. Jacobson, an associate in the bankruptcy department at the firm of
Kelley Drye & Warren in New York City, is a member of the New York State Bar
and concentrates in the fields of bankruptcy and creditors' rights.
Both authors give additional recognition to Gary Jacobson, a member of the
firm of Kelley Drye & Warren in New York City for his contributions to Part III of
this Article.
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cess' is an essential element in creating a confirmable plan of
reorganization. Claims are allowed unless an objection is filed.
If an objection is filed, the bankruptcy court, after notice and
hearing, determines the amount of the claim and may allow or
disallow it.2 For the purposes of allowing such claim, the court,
under § 502(c) of the Bankruptcy Code, may estimate any continI The claims objection process is governed by § 502 of the Bankruptcy Code
and Bankruptcy Rule 3007. Bankruptcy Rule 3007 provides:
An objection to the allowance of a claim shall be in writing and
filed. A copy of the objection with notice of the hearing thereon shall
be mailed or otherwise delivered to the claimant, the debtor or debtor
in possession and the trustee at least 30 days prior to the hearing. If
an objection to a claim is joined with a demand for relief of the kind
specified in Rule 7001, it becomes an adversary proceeding.
FED. R. BANKR. P. 3007. For text of relevant provisions of § 502, see infra notes 24.
2 Section 502(b) of the Bankruptcy Code provides:
(b) Except as provided in subsections (e)(2), (f), (g), (h) and (i)
of this section, if such objection to a claim is made, the court, after
notice and a hearing, shall determine the amount of such claim in lawful currency of the United States as of the date of the filing of the
petition, and shall allow such claim in such amount, except to the extent that

-

(1) such claim is unenforceable against the debtor and property
of the debtor, under any agreement or applicable law for a reason
other than because such claim is contingent or unmatured;
(2) such claim is for unmatured interest;
(3) if such claim is for a tax assessed against property of the estate, such claim exceeds the value of the interest of the estate in such
property;
(4) if such claim is for services of an insider or attorney of the
debtor, such claim exceeds the reasonable value of such services;
(5) such claim is for a debt that is unmatured on the date of the
filing of the petition and that is excepted from discharge under section 523(a)(5) of this title;
(6) if such claim is the claim of a lessor for damages resulting
from the termination of a lease of real property, such claim exceeds (A) the rent reserved by such lease, without acceleration, for the
greater of one year, or 15 percent, not to exceed three years, of the
remaining term of such lease, following the earlier of (i) the date of the filing of the petition; and
(ii) the date on which such lessor repossessed, or the lessee surrendered, the leased property; plus
(B) any unpaid rent due under such lease, without acceleration,
on the earlier of such dates;
(7) if such claim is the claim of an employee for damages resulting from the termination of an employment contract, such claim exceeds -

(A) the compensation provided by such contract, without acceleration, for one year following the earlier of (i) the date of the filing of the petition; or
(ii) the date on which the employer directed the employee to
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gent or unliquidated claim, where liquidating the amount of such
claim would otherwise unduly delay the administration of the
case. 3 In addition, under § 502(e)(1)(B), the court possesses the
authority to disallow a contingent claim or unliquidated claim in
its entirety.4
Once the contingent or unliquidated claim has become noncontingent by reason of judgment or settlement, however, the
claimant may obtain reconsideration of the disallowed or estimated claim pursuant to § 502(j) and Bankruptcy Rule 3008.1
Thus, potentially significant claims that were sharply reduced or
vanished entirely through estimation or disallowance may suddenly reappear. A potential claimant with a contingent and unliquidated claim is not clearly subject to any statute of limitations
and neither the statutory language, legislative history nor case
law provide any express time limit within which a subsequently
liquidated claim may be reconsidered. 6 Consequently, a confirmed plan of reorganization and disclosure statement may not
adequately reveal the distributions to be made to creditors, parterminate, or such employee terminated, performance under such
contract; plus
(B) any unpaid compensation due under such contract, without
acceleration, on the earlier of such dates; or
(8) such claim results from a reduction, due to late payment, in
the amount of an otherwise applicable credit available to the debtor in
connection with an employment tax on wages, salaries, or commissions earned from the debtor.
11 U.S.C. § 502(b) (1988).
3 Section 502(c) states:
(c) There shall be estimated for purposes of allowance under
this section (1) any contingent or unliquidated claim, the fixing or liquidation of which, as the case may be, would unduly delay the administration of the case; or
(2) any right to payment arising from a right to an equitable
remedy for breach of performance.
Id. § 502(c).
4 Section 502(e)(1) provides in pertinent part:
[T]he court shall disallow any claim for reimbursement or contribution of an entity that is liable with the debtor on or has secured, the
claim of a creditor, to the extent that (B) such claim for reimbursement or contribution is contingent as of
the time of allowance or disallowance of such claim for reimbursement or contribution ....
Id. § 502(e)(l)(B).
5 See id. § 502(j); FED. R. BANKR. P. 3008.
6 A claimant holding a contingent or unliquidated claim may be subject to a
five-year limitation under § 1143, however. See infra notes 77-78 and accompanying
text (discussing § 1143).
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ticularly where a subsequent liquidated and allowed contingent
claim is large in amount. 7 In short, the circularity inherent in
§ 502(j) may seriously imperil the finality of the plan voting
process.
Part II of this Article analyzes the historical development and
scope of § 502(j). Part III describes the time frame within which
a § 502(j) motion must be brought and delineates potential
problems inherent in the time frame. Part IV sets forth the factors that a court examines in determining whether a § 502(j) motion should be granted and, lastly, Part V concludes by
suggesting improvements to the current statutory language.
II.

THE GENESIS AND SCOPE OF SECTION

5020)

A. Derivation of Statutory Language
Currently, § 502(j), as amended by the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 19848 (the 1984 Amendment), provides:
A claim that has been allowed or disallowed may be reconsidered for cause. A reconsidered claim may be allowed or disallowed according to the equities of the case. Reconsideration
of a claim under this subsection does not affect the validity of
any payment or transfer from the estate made to a holder of an
allowed claim on account of such allowed claim that is not reconsidered, but if a reconsidered claim is allowed and is of the
same class as such holder's claim, such holder may not receive
any additional payment or transfer from the estate on account
of such holder's allowed claim until the holder of such reconsidered and allowed claim receives payment on account of
such claim proportionate in value to that already received by
such other holder. This subsection does not alter or modify
the trustee's right to recover from a creditor any excess payment or transfer made to such creditor. 9
Section 502(j) is supported by Bankruptcy Rule 3008, which states:
A party in interest may move for reconsideration of an order
allowing or disallowing a claim against the estate. The court
after a hearing on notice shall enter an appropriate order.' °
7 There exist a few inherent time restrictions within which a § 502(j) motion
for reconsideration must be brought. For a complete analysis, see infra notes 47-78
and accompanying text.
8 Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 95353, 98 Stat. 333 (1984) (codified as amended at I I U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1984)).
9 11 U.S.C. § 502(j).
10 FED. R. BANKR. P. 3008.
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The current statutory language is more expansive than the original language set forth in § 502(j) of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of
1978" (former Code § 502(j)). Former Code § 502(j) provided
that "[b]efore a case is closed, a claim that has been allowed may be
reconsidered for cause, and reallowed or disallowed according to
the equities of the case." 12 On its face, former Code § 502(j) did
not provide for the reconsideration of disallowed claims.
Section 502(j) was derived from sections 2a(2)'- and 57k 4 of
the former Bankruptcy Act of 1898'" (the Bankruptcy Act), as
amended, which, in turn, were derived from "the ancient and elementary power of a Bankruptcy Court to reconsider any of its orders
notwithstanding that an appeal also lies from some of its orders.' 6
Section 57k of the Bankruptcy Act provided: "Claims which have
11 The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549
(1978) (codified at 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-151302 (1988 & Supp. 11 1990)) amended by
Pub. L. No. 98-249, 98 Stat. 116 (1984); Pub. L. No. 98-271, 98 Stat. 163 (1984);
Pub. L. No. 98-299, 98 Stat. 214 (1984); Pub. L. No. 98-325, 98 Stat. 268 (1984);
Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353,
98 Stat. 333 (1984); Pub. L. No. 98-454, 98 Stat. 1745 (1984); Bankruptcy Judges,
United States Trustees, and Family Farmer Bankruptcy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99254, 100 Stat. 3088 (1984).
12 11 U.S.C. § 502(j), amended by 11 U.S.C. § 502(j) (1984).
13 11 U.S.C. § 11 (repealed 1978).
14 11 U.S.C. § 93(k) (repealed 1978).
15 Bankruptcy Act of 1898, July 1, 1898, c. 541, § 70(a), 30 Stat. 565, U.S.
Comp. Stat. 1901.
16 In re Republic Fabricators, Inc., 104 B.R. 933, 940 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1989).
Judge Learned Hand, referring to these "ancient and elementary powers,
commented:
On the other hand, if a referee is a court at all, there is no warrant for
saying because an appeal lies from his orders, that he has not the ancient and elementary power to reconsider those orders, nor the
faintest reason why he should not do so. That power is of course limited in duration when there are terms of court, but in bankruptcy
there are none. As to a referee's being a court, not only "may" he be
the "court of bankruptcy," he is affirmatively "invested ...with jurisdiction to .. . perform such part of the duties ... as are by this act
[title] conferred on courts of bankruptcy and as shall be prescribed by
rules or orders of the courts of bankruptcy of their respective
districts."
In re Pottasch Bros. Co., 79 F.2d 613, 616 (2d Cir. 1935) (citations omitted). See also
Wayne United Gas Co. v. Owens-Illinois Glass Co., 300 U.S. 131, 137 (1937) (stating that "the bankruptcy court, in the exercise of a sound discretion, if no intervening rights will be prejudiced by its action, may grant a rehearing upon application
diligently made and rehear the case upon the merits..."); In re Met-L-Wood Corp.,
861 F.2d 1012, 1018 (7th Cir. 1988) (observing that "the old inherent power to
reconsider bankruptcy orders has been merged into [Rule 60(b)]"), cert. denied, 490
U.S. 1006 (1989); Brielle Assoc. v. Graziano, 685 F.2d 109, 111 (3d Cir. 1982)
(discussing cases that have mentioned the " 'ancient and elementary power' of a
bankruptcy court to reconsider any of its orders").
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been allowed may be reconsidered for cause and reallowed or rejected in whole or in part according to the equities
of the case,
' 7
before but not after the estate has been closed."'
Section 2a(2) of the Bankruptcy Act provided in pertinent part:
The courts of the United States hereinbefore defined as
courts of bankruptcy are hereby created courts of bankruptcy
and are hereby invested, within their respective territorial limits as now established or as they may be hereafter changed,
with such jurisdiction at law and in equity as will enable them
to exercise original jurisdiction in proceedings under this title,
in vacation, in chambers, and during their respective terms, as
they are now or may be hereafter held, to - (2) Allow claims,
disallow claims, reconsider allowed or disallowed claims, and
allow or disallow them against bankrupt estates .

..."'

Although § 57k solely referred to the reconsideration of allowed
claims, § 2a(2) vested the court with jurisdiction to reconsider allowed or disallowed claims.
Similarly, Bankruptcy Rule 3008 was derived from former
Bankruptcy Rule 307, which provided that "[a] party in interest may
move for reconsideration of an order allowing or disallowing a claim
against the estate. If the motion is granted, the court may after
hearing on notice make such further order as may be
appropriate." 19
B.

Whether a Disallowed Claim may be Reheard

Although former Code § 57k provided for reconsideration
of allowed claims only, Bankruptcy Rule 307 also provided for
the reconsideration of disallowed claims. The Rule's advisory
committee note explained that Rule 307 was intended to prevent
the language of § 57k from being interpreted as preventing reconsideration of a disallowed claim. 20 Despite the language of
§ 57k, Rule 307 did not conflict with the Bankruptcy Act, given
the language of § 2a(2) that provided the bankruptcy court with
jurisdiction to reconsider allowed or disallowed claims: "Rule
3008 and former Rule 307 expanded, respectively, on preamendment section 502(j) of the Code and Section 57k of the former
Act by permitting reconsideration of disallowed as well as allowed claims."

21

U.S.C. § 93(k) (repealed 1978).
Id.§ lI(a)(2).
19 FED. R. BANKR. P. 307 (1976).
17 11
18

20 Id.(advisory committee's note).
21 8 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY
3008.02

(15th ed. 1993).
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When enacting former Code § 502(j), Congress carried over
the language of § 57k, yet failed to appropriate the language of
§ 2a(2) that vested bankruptcy courts with the power to reconsider a disallowed as well as an allowed claim. Thus, in drafting
former Code § 502(j), Congress created an ambiguity between
Bankruptcy Rule 307 and the new statute - while former Code
§ 502(j) provided only that an allowed claim could be reconsidered, Rule 307 provided for "reconsideration of an order allowing or disallowing a claim against the estate. ' 22 The statutory
omission made it unclear whether the bankruptcy court could reconsider an order disallowing a claim.
Commentators and several courts concluded that Congress
intended to eliminate the courts' power to rehear a disallowed
claim.23 Indeed, it has been observed that:
The express legislative intent to recodify § 57k of the 1898 Act
might be construed as a rejection of the view taken in Bankruptcy Rule 307, and an adoption of the view that "the purpose of [former § 57k] is to protect the estate against claims
which have been erroneously allowed; not to protect the creditor against partial disallowance. He needs no such protection.
If he is aggrieved by the referee's order of allowance, he may
petition for review . . . and, if necessary, appeal from the

court's order. But the remedy by review and appeal would not
be adequate protection for the estate. Claims are usually allowed before the trustee or other creditors have had any opportunity to get sufficient information to oppose
them or to
' 24
determine whether the allowance is correct.

This view was buttressed by the well-settled principle that "rules
and regulations which are ...executive or administrative..

.

are not

controlling on the courts, and cannot alter or extend the plain
25
meaning of a statute.
Despite this reasoning and the omission of a provision similar
to § 2a(2) from former Code § 502(j), the Third Circuit Court of
Appeals and the Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel reached
the opposite conclusion and held that a bankruptcy court possesses
22 FED. R. BANKR.

P. 307 (1976).

23 See In re Sapienza, 27 B.R. 526, 528 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1983) (quoting 1 BANKRUPTCY SERVICE LAWYER'S EDrIION § 628(1), at 535).
24 Id.
25 82 C.J.S. Statutes to Stipulation § 359 (1953). See Koshland v. Helvering, 298
U.S. 441, 447 (1936) (declaring that "where . . . the provisions of [an] act are am-

biguous, and its directions specific, there is no power to amend it by regulation").
See also 28 U.S.C. § 2075 (1988) (providing that "the Bankruptcy Rules shall not
abridge, enlarge, or modify any substantive right").
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the power to reconsider a disallowed claim. 26 These courts noted
that Bankruptcy Rule 307 was based upon the ancient and elementary power of a referee to reconsider any of his orders. 2 7 Accordingly, in the absence of any legislative history indicating disapproval
of Rule 307, a previously disallowed claim was eligible for
reconsideration. 8
On August 1, 1983, new Bankruptcy Rules became effective,
and Rule 3008 supplanted former Rule 307.29 Rule 3008 provided,
in part, that "[a] party in interest may move for . .. an order allowing or disallowing a claim against the estate." 3' The advisory committee comments to Rule 3008 noted that in enacting the rule,
Congress adopted the reasoning behind former Rule 307: "[The]
rule recognizes, as did former Bankruptcy Rule 307, the power of
the court to reconsider an order of disallowance on appropriate motion."' 3 ' As with Rule 307, however, Rule 3008 was inconsistent
with the more restrictive language of the statute, former Code
§ 502(j), which referred solely to allowed claims.
A 1984 Amendment to § 502(j) finally put the issue to rest by
expressly providing for the reconsideration of disallowed as well as
allowed claims. Thus, it is presently undisputed that bankruptcy
courts have jurisdiction to reconsider orders disallowing claims.
26 See Brielle Assoc. v. Graziano, 685 F.2d 109, 111-12 (3d Cir. 1982); In re Resources Reclamation Corp. of America, 34 B.R. 771, 772 (BAP 9th Cir. 1983). See
also In re Miles, 39 B.R. 494, 497 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1984) (holding that bankruptcy
court is empowered to reconsider disallowed claim); In re Washington County
Broadcasting, Inc., 39 B.R. 77, 78-79 (Bankr. D. Me. 1984) (same) (citations omitted).
It should be noted that § 502(j) may not be used to extend a creditor's time
limit to file a claim. In re Government Sec. Corp., 107 B.R. 1012, 1022-23 (S.D. Fla.
1989). Section 502(j) only applies "to reconsideration of an orderallowing or disallowing a claim," and where no order has previously been entered with respect to
the allowance or disallowance of a late-filed claim, the section does not apply. In re
Government Sec. Corp., 95 B.R. 829, 833 (S.D. Fla. 1988). See also In re McLean
Indus., Inc., 121 B.R. 704, 707 n.6 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1990) (stressing that § 502(j)
only applies where there has been a court order allowing or disallowing the claim);
In re Padget, 119 B.R. 793, 799 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1990) (stating that § 502(j) cannot
be used by a creditor to object to the treatment of the undersecured portion of its
claim where the creditor failed to properly amend its secured proof of claim to
include its undersecured portion as an unsecured claim).
27 Brielle Assoc., 685 F.2d at 111. See Resources Reclamation, 34 B.R. at 772-73
(adopting the Third Circuit's reasoning in Brielle).
28 Brielle Assoc., 685 F.2d at 111-12; Resources Reclamation, 34 B.R. at 773.
29 The Bankruptcy Rules were superseded in 1991 by the new Federal Rules of
Bankruptcy Procedure. See FED. R. BANKR. P. 1001-9035 (1991). Nevertheless, the
text of Bankruptcy Rule 3008 remains unchanged.
30 FED. R. BANKR. P. 3008 (emphasis added).
31 Id. (advisory committee's note).
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Whether Section 502(j) may be Used to Recover Distributions

One concern arising from § 502(j) is whether the section
can lead to disgorgement of distributions already made under a
confirmed plan. The general rule derived from the plain meaning of § 502(j) and case law is that dividends already paid to
other creditors may not be recovered where a claim previously
disallowed has been reconsidered and allowed. Instead, future
dividend payments will be dedicated first as "catch-up" payments
to the holder of the newly allowed claim. In accordance with the
current statutory language, the Sixth Circuit, in In re Chattanooga
Wholesale Antiques, Inc. ,32 which was decided under former Code
§ 502(j), held that a court's authority to reconsider a claim did
not grant the trustee power to recover dividends already paid
under a confirmed plan. 3 The Sixth Circuit remarked:
The [bankruptcy] court did not balance the equities because it concluded, as a matter of law, that § 502(j), both as it
stood in 1982 and as it was amended in 1984, did not permit
recovery of post-confirmation payments in the present case.
The bankruptcy court relied upon the fact that the confirmation of a plan revests the property of the estate in the debtor
and that § 549(a) limits the right of a trustee's recovery to
transfers of estate property. When property revests in the
debtor, the binding effect of the confirmation order as provided in § 1141 (a) would be rendered meaningless if a trustee
could recapture payments made pursuant to the order. Section 502(j) was not intended to provide an avenue
of attack on
34
the finality of a binding order of confirmation.
Contrary authority exists, however. Applying former Code
§ 502(j), the bankruptcy court in In re Kelderman,35 vacated its prior
"order for payment of dividends" and further ordered the trustee, if
necessary, to "commence an adversary proceeding pursuant to
Bankruptcy Rule 7001(1) to recover excess dividends paid to creditors."3 6 In Kelderman, a creditor's proof of claim, date-stamped by
the court clerk, inexplicably failed to reach the court file or the
claims register. Consequently, the chapter 7 trustee omitted the
creditor from the final petition for allowance, distribution and dis930 F.2d 458 (6th Cir. 1991).
Id. at 463-64.
34 Id. at 464.
35 75 B.R. 69 (Bankr. S.D. Iowa 1987). Even though the reconsideration motion
was brought in 1984, the debtor in Kelderman had filed its bankruptcy petition in
1983, and, as a result, the court looked to former Code § 502(j) rather than the
version enacted by the 1984 Amendment. Id. at 70.
32
33

36

Id. at 71.
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charge, as well as the order for the payment of dividends. The creditor did not receive notice of the final report or dividend payment.
Five months after the order for payment of dividends was issued,
the creditor sought reconsideration under § 502(j) as well as the
recovery of dividends already distributed to other creditors. The
Kelderman court determined that it had an "implied grant of authority to reconsider an order of payment and to authorize recovery of
37
excess payments."
The importance of Kelderman may be diminished in that the case
was decided under former Code § 502(j), which did not include the
current statutory language that "[r]econsideration of a claim under
this subsection does not affect the validity of any payment or transfer from the estate made to a holder of an allowed claim that is not
reconsidered."3 " The Kelderman court, in dictum, apparently disregarded this express language, however, stating that the trustee
could recover any excess dividends under the last sentence of the
1984 Amendment to Code § 502(j), which provided that "Itihis
subsection does not alter or modify the trustee's right to recover
from a creditor any excess payment or transfer made to such
39
creditor."
Kelderman appears to be an anomalous case, most likely limited
to the situation where the court attempts to correct its clerk's own
mistake, rather than any error caused by negligence or inadvertence
of the movant. Moreover, Kelderman probably is not authoritative in
light of the language contained in § 502(j) of the current Code and
other case law.
D.

Whether Section 502(j) may be Used to Alter a Prior Vote

Another issue that has arisen under § 502(j) is whether the
section may be used to alter a prior vote. Section 502(j) permits
the reconsideration of an allowed or disallowed claim. Case law,
however, limits such reconsideration to determining a creditor's
right to share in distributions and does not extend to permitting
a creditor to vote after a plan has been confirmed.40 Although no
37 Id. at 70. See also In re Jules Meyers Pontiac, Inc., 779 F.2d 480, 482 (9th Cir.
1985) (concluding that § 57(1) of the Bankruptcy Act provided the bankruptcy court
with the power to order recovery of erroneously paid dividends pursuant to an
amended order upon weighing the equities of the case).
38 11 U.S.C. § 502(j).
39 See id.; Kelderman, 75 B.R. at 70.
40 See, e.g., In re Graco, Inc., 267 F. Supp. 952, 955 (D. Conn. 1967) (stating that
"claims allowed and voting at the time of the conclusion of the creditors' meeting
will not be nullified ... because subsequently disallowed pursuant to the action of
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legislative guidance exists as to whether § 502(j) may be used to
alter the voting rights of creditors, the bankruptcy court, in In re

Spring Gardens Foliage, Inc.,4 reasoned:

A binding and final determination of the acceptances prior to
the confirmation of a plan is . . . not only sensible, but selfevident and dictated by the economic realities of business
life.... [If § 502(j) could be used to determine and change
voting rights,] objections interposed to claims under § 502(j)
could change the result of the vote at any time so long as the
case is open and even after confirmation. There is nothing in
the Code which indicates that Congress intended to change
the scheme
of determination of the vote on a plan by enacting
42
§ 502(j).

The approach taken by the court in Spring Gardens is quite sensible. Any other approach would severely threaten the finality of the
confirmation process.

E.

Section 502(j) may not be Used to Reconsider Valuation Dates
Furthermore, § 502(j) may not be employed to change the

valuation date of collateral. In In re McAteer, 4 3 the debtors filed a
joint chapter 13 petition. Prior to their filing, the debtors obtained a purchase money loan with which to purchase a motor
vehicle. In connection with this loan, the debtors purchased
credit life insurance. After the filing, the court confirmed the
debtors' plan, which proposed to pay the secured creditor the
value of its vehicle, as well as ten percent of the unsecured balance. Eight months after confirmation, one of the debtors died
and the insurance company paid the secured creditor the full
amount due on the purchase money loan, an amount that exceeded the payments to the secured creditor under the plan. The
court granted the surviving debtor's motion to compel the turnover of the insurance funds and denied the secured creditor's
cross-motion for reconsideration of its claim.4 4
The McAteer court held that the value of the bank's secured
the referee or court under § 2(2) [sic] and § 57(k)"); In re Spring Garden Foliage,
Inc., 17 B.R. 882, 885 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1982) (concluding that "§ 502(j) indeed
permits the reconsideration of an allowed claim, but only for the purpose of determination of the creditor's right whose claim is subject to reconsideration to share in
the distribution and not for the purpose of voting after the plan has been
confirmed").
41 17 B.R. 882 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1982).
42 Id. at 885.
43 130 B.R. 726 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1991).
44 Id. at 729.
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claim was fixed at the time of the petition's filing and did not
change merely because it was paid with insurance proceeds.45
Section 502(j) could not be used to re-evaluate the creditor's secured claim and thereby increase the amount it would receive
under the confirmed plan of reorganization. The court explained
that "the value of... [the secured creditor's collateral] is established and fixed by § 506(a). The amount of a claim is not impacted by the nature of the proceeds used to pay that claim,
rather it is dependent solely upon the value of the collateral at
'46
the time of the filing."

III.
A.

TIME LIMITATIONS

Prior Statutory Language

Section 57k of the Bankruptcy Act and former Code § 502(j)
plainly stated that a claim could be reconsidered before, but not
after, an estate was closed.4 7 Several courts have interpreted the
time limitations associated with sections 57k and 2a(2) flexibly:
[Tlhe primary objective of the allowance [of a claim] ...is to

ensure that the ultimate distribution of the bankrupt estate
comports with the requirements of the Bankruptcy Act. Since
a strict time limitation upon the filing of objections would be
inconsistent with the attainment of that goal, these sections
support the conclusion that [other sections of the Bankruptcy
Act] ...should not operate as a bar to the consideration of the
48

trustee's objections to the allowance of a claim.
Former Code § 502(j), however, only spoke to the reconsideration of an allowed claim, and made no mention of a disallowed
claim. Thus, prior to the 1984 Amendment, former Bankruptcy
Rule 307 and Bankruptcy Rule 3008 failed to specify whether, in
addition to an allowed claim, a disallowed claim could be reconsid45 Id.

46 Id. The McAteer approach, which uses the petition date as the valuation date
for the purpose of determining whether a secured creditor is entitled to adequate
protection, is not universally accepted. For example, several courts have held that
for purposes of determining whether a creditor is entitled to adequate protection
for the decline in value of its collateral, the collateral should be valued as of the
date that the secured creditor filed its motion for adequate protection. See, e.g., In re
Continental Airlines, Inc., 146 B.R. 536, 540 (Bankr. D. Del. 1992) (on appeal); In
re Best Products Co., 138 B.R. 155, 156-57 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1992).
47 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY
502.10 (15th ed. 1993). Cf In re Cote, 313 F.
Supp. 509, 512 n.6 (D. Me. 1970).
48 In re Cushman Bakery, 526 F.2d 23, 36 (1st Cir. 1975), cert. denied sub nom.
Agger v. Seaboard Allied Milling Corp., 425 U.S. 937 (1976). See In re Supreme
Synthetic Dyers, Inc., 3 B.R. 189, 191-92 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1980) (citing Cushman).
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ered because, among other factors, these Rules provided no time
limit within which a motion to reconsider an order disallowing a
claim had to be brought.49 Nevertheless, most courts held that a
motion to reconsider a disallowed claim also had to be brought
before the case was closed.5 °
The 1984 Amendment specifically eliminated the language
"before a case is closed" from § 502(j). 5 1 Several commentators
and courts have interpreted this change to mean that there is no
longer any clear time limit within which to bring reconsideration
motions.52
B.

Case Law
Although there appears to be no case directly on point, dicta

49 See In re Baldwin-United Corp., 55 B.R. 885, 898 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1985)
(noting that under the former § 502(j) "creditors may seek to have any allowed or
disallowed claim reconsidered for cause, so long as the case has not been closed").
Cf. In re Int'l Home Design, Inc., 28 B.R. 584, 586 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1983) (noting
the absence of time limits in Rule 307). For a discussion of whether a motion to
reconsider may be denied due to the prejudicial effect of the resulting delay, see
infra notes 79-103 and accompanying text.
50 See In re Gurwitch, 37 B.R. 513, 515 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1984) (requiring a motion to reconsider a disallowed claim to be brought before a case is closed), rev'd on
othergrounds, 54 B.R. 927 (S.D. Fla. 1985), aff'd, 794 F.2d 584 (11 th Cir. 1986); In re
Resources Reclamation Corp. of America, 34 B.R. 771, 773 (BAP 9th Cir. 1983)
(asserting that "the only time limitation on a motion for reconsideration of an order allowing or disallowing a claim is that the motion must be made before the case
is closed").
51 Where final distributions have been made, the better view is that no purpose
would be served by reopening the case to reconsider a previously disallowed claim,
in that the plain language of § 502(j) prohibits recovery of dividends already distributed. As noted, however, Kelderman appears to preserve a court's authority to
recapture dividends already distributed. See In re Kelderman, 75 B.R. 69, 70 (Bankr.
S.D. Iowa 1987). See supra text accompanying notes 35-39 (discussing Kelderman).
Based on Kelderman, a creditor may seek to reopen a case for the reconsideration of
a claim even where all of the estate's property has been distributed. See In re MCorp
Fin., Inc., 137 B.R. 219 (Bankr. S.D. Tex.), appeal dismissed and remanded, 139 B.R.
820 (S.D. Tex. 1992).
52 See 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY
502.10 (15th ed. 1993) (contending that the
deletion of the language "before a case is closed" "makes section 502(j) more consistent with Bankruptcy Rule 3008, which permits reconsideration to be granted
once a case is reopened") (footnote omitted); FED. R. BANKR. P. 3008 advisory committee's note (stating that "if a case is reopened ... reconsideration of the allowance or disallowance of a claim may be sought and granted in accordance with
[Rule 3008]"); In re Int'l Yacht and Tennis, Inc., 922 F.2d 659, 662 n.5 (11th Cir.
1991) (positing that the effect of the deletion of the language "most likely is to
permit reconsideration of claims once a case is reopened") (citations omitted); In re
Associated Air Servs., Inc., 100 B.R. 106, 107 (S.D. Fla. 1988) (finding no clear
time limit for motions for reconsideration); In re Turchon, 62 B.R. 461, 464 n.3
(Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1986) (stating that motion for reconsideration may be made upon
reopening of case).
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in several cases suggest that there may be no time limitation for
the reconsideration of a claim that was disallowed as contingent
but later liquidated in amount. In United States v. Rowe, 53 for example, the district court affirmed the bankruptcy court's order
disallowing a proof of claim filed by the Internal Revenue Service
(IRS). 54 The IRS asserted a claim against an individual debtor as
a secondary obligor for withholding taxes owed by a corporate
debtor of which the individual was the president and majority
stockholder. The corporate debtor's plan of reorganization provided for full payment of this tax claim. The Rowe court held that
disallowing the contingent claim against the debtor's estate
would not cause irreparable injury to the IRS because the
debtor's case could be reopened to allow the claim should the
corporate debtor fail to pay.55 Because the Rowe court imposed
no time limitation, the IRS could have moved for reconsideration
of the claim at any time after confirmation, thereby threatening
the finality of the chapter 11 process.
In In re MCorp Financial, Inc. ,56 a bankruptcy court in the
Southern District of Texas held that a plan of reorganization may
not be used to limit the time in which a claim may be reconsidered, nor the amount that a contested claimant may receive
under the plan. The MCorp Financialcourt denied confirmation
of the debtor's plan of reorganization, which provided for the estimation of contested claims. The purpose of such estimation
was to establish an aggregate cap on the amount that could be
distributed on account of such claims. Pursuant to the plan, the
amount of the claims could be reduced below, but could never
exceed, the estimated cap. 51 In effect, over $2 billion in contested claims were to be capped, for distribution purposes, at
$120 million unless liquidated in amount by a certain date. The
1989 WL 163860 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 23, 1989).
Id. at *1.
Id. at *4. See also In re Costello, 136 B.R. 296, 298 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1992)
(recognizing that § 502(j) "technically permits reconsideration of the allowance or
disallowance of any claim so long as the case is open for 'cause' "); In re Lane, 68
B.R. 609, 613 (Bankr. D. Haw. 1986) (noting in dictum that a claim that was estimated at a certain amount may be reconsidered at a later date after the claim had
become liquidated in another forum); In re Baldwin-United Corp., 55 B.R. 885, 898
(Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1985) (asserting that "the estimation of a claim conclusively sets
the outer limits of a claimant's right to recover either from the debtor or the estate
...
subject only to a § 502(j) motion for reconsideration at a later time").
56 137 B.R. 219 (Bankr. S.D. Tex.), appeal dismissed and remanded, 139 B.R. 820
(S.D. Tex. 1992).
57 Id. at 226.
58 Id. at 224.
53
54
55
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court denied confirmation, finding that the plan violated
§ 502(j), which allows for the adjustment of claims previously estimated under § 502(c) after such claims become liquidated in
amount or their contingency is removed.5 9 The MCorp Financial
court maintained:
It is clear that the estimation procedure is not complete without the claimant's right to a § 502(j) reconsideration. If a
plan proponent could cut off a claimant's right to a § 502(j)
reconsideration, Congress' passage of that provision would be
meaningless, and the result would be in contravention of the
legislative history on the estimation procedure.... In essence,
the plan provisions terminate contested claimants' rights to
any § 502(j) reconsideration upward as a result of the cap on
the contested claims ...[and the] deadline for establishing the
cap .... 60
In the decision, the court attempted to balance the interests of preserving the disputed claimants' rights to an effective appeal against
the interests of the debtor and creditors in a viable plan.
Nevertheless, the holding of MCorp. Financialmay be limited to
extraordinary facts. The plan contemplated the reduction of contested claims in the amount of $2 billion to $120 million. In addition, the three-month period during which the claimants would have
been able to liquidate their claims under the plan may also be considered unreasonable. Lastly, the estimation procedure contemplated by the plan was also found to discriminate against the class of
contingent claimants vis-a-vis uncontested claimants. Under the
plan, although some money was set aside for contested claims, that
amount was most likely insufficient to pay all contested claims after
estimation by the bankruptcy court. In short, the plan was discriminatory because its provisions regarding the capped reserve and the
estimation process limited the debtor's liability for contested claims
"to a pro rata amount that may be based on less than the full allowed amount of such claim[s], while providing holders of uncontested claims their pro rata distribution based on the full allowed

amount of their claims. "61
C.

Current Bankruptcy and Procedure Rules
Bankruptcy Rule 3008 provides similar guidance on the time

59 Id. at 226.
60 Id.

61 Id. at 227-28.
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constraints for filing a motion for reconsideration. 62 The advisory committee note to Rule 3008, referring to former Code
§ 502(j), states that "[t]he rule expands § 502(j) which provides
for reconsideration of an allowance only before the case is closed
....

If a case is reopened as provided in § 350(b) of the Code,

reconsideration of the allowance or disallowance of a claim may
be sought and granted in accordance with this rule." '6 3
Although § 502(j) and Rule 3008 provide no express time
limit within which a motion for reconsideration must be brought,
Bankruptcy Rule 9024 creates a one-year time limitation where a
claim was allowed or disallowed after a "contest" and where the
grounds for reconsideration are: (i) "mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect;"'64 (ii) "newly discovered evidence
which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to
move for a new trial;"'6 5 or (iii) "fraud . .

.,

misrepresentation, or

an adverse party's other misconduct. ' 66 Rule 9024 was derived
from former Bankruptcy Rule 924 and expressly applies Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) to bankruptcy cases.67 Rule 9024
provides in relevant part:
Rule 60 F.R. Civ. P. applies in cases under the Code except
that (1) a motion to reopen a case under the Code or for the
reconsideration of an order allowing or disallowing a claim
62 See In re Associated Air Services, Inc., 100 B.R. 106, 107 (S.D. Fla. 1988) (discussing and interpreting Rule 3008).
63 FED. R. BANKR. P. 3008 advisory committee's note. Former Rule 307 was silent as to the time within which reconsideration must be requested. The advisory
committee's note to Rule 307 and case law, however, supported reconsideration of
a claim at any time as long as the bankruptcy court retained control of the case.
64 FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1). The Supreme Court recently defined the standard
for "excusable neglect" in connection with the failure to timely file a proof of claim.
In Pioneer Investment Servs. Co. v. Brunswick Assocs. Ltd. Partnership,the Court resolved
a conflict in the court of appeals and refused to limit excusable neglect to circumstances beyond the control of the flier. Pioneer Investment Servs. Co. v. Brunswick
Assocs. Ltd. Partnership, 113 S. Ct. 1489 (1993). The Court found excusable neglect to be a more "elastic concept" which, under certain circumstances, encompassed negligence. Id. at 1491. The Court held that the determination as to
whether the negligence was "excusable" was an "equitable one" and should be
based on consideration "of all relevant circumstances surrounding the party's
omission," including "the danger of prejudice to the debtor, the length of the delay
and its potential impact on judicial proceedings, the reason for the delay, including
whether it was within the reasonable control of the movant, and whether the movant acted in good faith." Id. at 1498 (footnotes omitted). Thus, where a party
moves for reconsideration of his claim on the grounds of excusable neglect, the
factors set forth in PioneerInvestment should be given due regard.
65 FED.

66 FED.

R. Civ. P. 60(b)(2).
R. Civ. P. 60(b)(3);

FED.

R.

BANKR.

P. 9024

See Karen-Richard Beauty Salon, Inc. v. Fontainebleau Hotel Corp., 36 B.R.
896, 898 (S.D. Fla. 1983).
67
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against the estate entered without a contest is not subject to
the one year limitation prescribed in Rule 60(b) .... "
Therefore, where a claim is allowed or disallowed after a "contest,"
the right to seek reconsideration under § 502(j) on one of the enumerated grounds is subject to the one-year time limitation set forth
in Rule 60(b). 69 As explained in Collier:
An order of allowance or disallowance, whether contested or
not, may be the subject of a motion for reconsideration. The
only difference is that, in the absence of a contest, the motion
for reconsideration must be made within a reasonable time,
and is not precluded
by the expiration of one year from the
70
entry of the order.
The one-year time limitation was applied in In re Costello,7
where the bankruptcy court denied the debtor's request for reconsideration. The Costello debtor objected to the allowance of an attorney's claim. By order granted upon a motion filed by the attorney
and opposed by the debtor, the attorney's claim was allowed. The
debtor's motion for a rehearing was denied and no notice of appeal
was filed.72 More than a year after entry of the order allowing the
claim, the debtor filed a motion for reconsideration of the claim,
maintaining that she had discovered new evidence that the fee contract entered into with the claimant had been forged. The court
determined:
[N]otwithstanding the provisions of § 502(j) and of Bankruptcy Rule 3008, when the allowance of a claim has in fact,
been litigated, the litigants cannot seek reconsideration of the
Bankruptcy Court's determination pursuant to the recognized
standard of Rule 60, if they elect not to pursue a timely appeal
73
of the original Order allowing or disallowing the claim.
Agreeing with the Costello interpretation of Rule 9024, the bankruptcy court in In re Excello Press, Inc. 74 approved of an earlier Fifth
Circuit decision that stated:
We interpret Rule 9024 to provide that when a proof of claim
has in fact been litigated between parties to a bankruptcy proceeding the litigants must seek reconsideration of the bankruptcy
68 FED. R. BANKR. P. 9024. For the relevant text of Rule 60(b), see infra text
accompanying note 83.
69

70

See
12

FED.

R. Civ. P. 60(b).

COLLIER ON BANKRUPrCY

307.04(1] (14th ed. 1978).

136 B.R. 296 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1992).
Id. at 297-98.
Id. at 299 (citation omitted).
74 83 B.R. 539 (Bankr. N.D. Ill.), aff'd, 90 B.R. 335 (N.D. Ill. 1988), rev'd on other
grounds, 890 F.2d 896 (7th Cir. 1989).
71
72
73
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court's determinationpursuant to the usual Rule 60 standards if they
elect not to pursue a timely appealof the originalorderallowing or disallowing the claim.75
Accordingly, where the order allowing or disallowing a claim was
entered after a contest, Rule 9024 is fully applicable and the timeliness of a § 502(j) motion is subject to the Rule's one-year time
limitation.7 6
D.

Section 1143 may Provide a Five-Year Limitation

An additional time limitation on a claim's reconsideration
may be presented by § 1143 of the Bankruptcy Code.7 7 The provision establishes a five-year limitation on the surrender or presentment of securities or the performance of any act that
constitutes a prerequisite for participation in distribution under
the plan. 78 The five-year limitation runs from the entry date of a
confirmation order of a reorganization plan. Assuming that "any
other act as a condition to participation in distributions under the
plan" includes a motion for reconsideration under § 502(j),
§ 1143 may provide a statutory time limitation within which such
a motion must be brought. In short, where a claimant wishes to
have its previously disallowed claim reconsidered and to receive
the concomitant distributions under a plan of reorganization, it
75 Id. at 541 (quoting In re Colley, 814 F.2d 1008, 1009 (5th Cir.), cert. denied sub
nom., Colley v. Nat'l Bank of Texas, 484 U.S. 898 (1987)). See 9 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY
9024.04 n.7 (15th ed. 1993) (citing Colley).
76 There appears to be no authority defining or circumscribing the term "contest," nor determining a dispute's extent or nature, if any, that may not rise to the
level of a "contest."
Even where the order was entered after a contest, the one year limitation may
not be absolute. Rule 60(b)(6) empowers the court to reopen a judgment even
after one year has passed for "any other reason justifying relief from the operation
of the judgment." FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6). See Pioneer Investment Servs. Co. v.
Brunswick Assocs. Ltd. Partnership, 113 S. Ct. 1489, 1497 (1993) (asserting that
relief under 60(b)(6) will only be required upon a showing of" 'extraordinary circumstances' suggesting that the party is faultless in the delay").
77 Section 1143 reads:
If a plan requires presentment or surrender of a security or the performance of any other act as a condition to participation in distribution under the plan, such action shall be taken not later than five years
after the date of the entry of the order of confirmation. Any entity
that has not within such time presented or surrendered such entity's
security or taken any such other action that the plan requires may not
participate in distribution under the plan.
11 U.S.C. § 1143 (1979).
78 H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 419 (1977); S. REP. No. 989, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. 130 (1978).
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must seek relief within five years of the confirmation order's
entry.
IV.

STANDARDS FOR DETERMINING WHETHER A CLAIM SHOULD
BE RECONSIDERED

A. Statutory Language
Section 57k provided that "[c]laims which have been allowed

may be reconsidered for cause." 7' 9 Currently, § 502(j) likewise
declares that "[a] claim that has been allowed or disallowed may
be reconsidered for cause." 8° Consequently, a court will only reconsider a previously allowed or disallowed claim where "cause"
is shown. It has been further established that "the reconsideration of a claim under § 502(j) and Bankruptcy Rule 3008 is discretionary and the court may decline to reconsider a claim
without a hearing or notice to parties involved." 8' Pursuant to
Bankruptcy Rule 9024, the bounds of such discretion are dictated
by Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.8 2 The relevant part of Rule 60(b) states:
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may
relieve a party.., from a final judgment, order, or proceeding
for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise,
or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence which by
due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move
for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud .

. .,

misrepresenta-

tion, or other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or
discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based has
been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application; or
(6) any other
reason justifying relief from the operation of the
83
judgment.
79 11 U.S.C. § 57k (repealed 1978) (emphasis added).
80 11 U.S.C. § 502(j) (emphasis added).
81 In re Bicoastal Corp., 126 B.R. 613, 614-15 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1991) (citing In
re Colley, 814 F.2d 1008, 1010 (5th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom., Colley v. Nat'l Bank of
Texas, 484 U.S. 898 (1987)). See In re Commodore Corp., 70 B.R. 543, 545 (Bankr.
N.D. Ind. 1987) (stating that reconsideration is within the court's sound discretion);
In re Fox, 64 B.R. 148, 152 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1986) (same); In re Flagstaff Foodservice Corp., 56 B.R. 910, 913 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986) (same).
82 Bicoastal Corp., 126 B.R. at 615; In re Cleanmaster Indus., Inc., 106 B.R. 628,
630 (BAP 9th Cir. 1989); In re Motor Freight Express, 91 B.R. 705, 710 (Bankr.
E.D. Pa. 1988); In re Excello Press, Inc., 83 B.R. 539, 541 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. ), aff'd,
90 B.R. 335 (N.D. Ill. 1988), rev'd on othergrounds, 890 F.2d 896 (7th Cir. 1989); In re
Kelderman, 75 B.R. 69, 70 (Bankr. S.D. Iowa 1987).

83 FED.

R. Civ. P. 60(b).
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Case Law

There exists limited authority suggesting that § 502(j) and
Bankruptcy Rule 3008 should be liberally construed. 84 The majority of courts have maintained, however, that § 502(j) and Rule
3008 should "be applied in light of the strong.., policy of encouraging prompt, final dispositions of objections to proofs of
claims." 85 As observed by the court in In re WE. Hurley, Inc. ,86
"[i]f reconsideration were a matter of right, the finality sought to
be established by the strict time limits of Rule 802 [the earlier
version of Rule 8002] would be illusory."87
In In re Resources Reclamation Corp. of America,88 an unsecured
claim was disallowed when the creditor failed to attend the hearing at which the trustee objected to the claim.8 9 The bankruptcy
court denied the creditor's motion to reconsider its claim due to
the prejudice to other creditors that would result from allowing
the creditor's claim, in that the other creditors' prospective dividend would be decreased. 90 Reversing the bankruptcy court, the
Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the Ninth Circuit declared that
"the mere fact that allowance of a claim would dilute dividends
which would otherwise be paid is not the type of injury that
should result in disallowance of the claim."'" Instead, in deciding whether to reconsider a claim, the appellate panel considered
the following factors: (1) whether granting reconsideration
would delay the proceeding, thereby prejudicing the debtor or
other creditors; (2) the delay's length and its effect on efficient
court administration; (3) "whether the delay was beyond the rea84 See In re Washington County Broadcasting, Inc., 39 B.R. 77, 79 (Bankr. D. Me.
1984); Bicoastal Corp., 126 B.R. at 615.
85 See, e.g., Motor Freight Express, 91 B.R. at 711; Bicoastal Corp., 126 B.R. at 615
(citing Motor Freight Express).
86 612 F.2d 392 (8th Cir. 1980).
87 Id. at 395. Current Bankruptcy Rule 8002(a) was derived from former Rule
802(a) of the Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure. Both rules require an appellant to
file a notice of appeal with the clerk of the court within ten days from the date of
entry of the judgment, order or decree from which an appeal is taken. FED. R.
BANKR. P. 8002(a); FED. R. BANKR. P. 802(a) (1976). See In re Costello, 136 B.R.
296, 298 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1992) (acknowledging that "while a Bankruptcy Court
has the power to reconsider the allowance or disallowance of a claim for cause by
virtue of § 502(j) and Bankruptcy Rule 3008, the court's discretion should not encourage parties to avoid the usual rules for finality of contested matters").
88 34 B.R. 771 (BAP 9th Cir. 1983).
89 Id. at 772 (discussing the proceedings before the bankruptcy court).

90 Id.

91 Id. at 773. Cf In re Gibraltor Amusements Ltd., 315 F.2d 210, 216 (2d Cir.
1963).
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sonable control of the person whose duty it was to perform;" (4)
whether the creditor's actions were in good faith; (5) "whether
clients should be penalized for their counsel's mistake or neglect;" and (6) whether the claimant had a meritorious claim.92
Thus, if a long period of time has elapsed since disallowance of a
creditor's claim, and if other creditors or parties in interest relied
on such disallowance, or would be prejudiced by allowance at
such a late date, the claim should not be reconsidered.
Important concerns in determining the appropriateness of
reconsideration include the stage in the plan confirmation or
bankruptcy process and the extent to which dividends have already been distributed. For example, in In re Bicoastal Corp. ,g the
bankruptcy court suggested that the imminence of confirmation
of a reorganization plan might be one circumstance weighing towards refusal to reconsider a claim, because reconsideration at
that time might impede the progress of the chapter 11 case.94
Furthermore, courts generally do not reconsider prior orders allowing or disallowing a claim where no new evidence is
presented. In In re Excello Press, Inc. ,5 the bankruptcy court refused to reconsider its prior order disallowing a claim where the
creditor failed to offer any novel evidence.9 6 The creditor sought
reconsideration based on allegations of its excusable neglect in
failing to present certain evidence and errors of law by the court.
The Excello Press court found that the creditor should have been
aware that such evidence was necessary and that the creditor had
an opportunity to present such evidence at the time of the disallowance.97 Determining further that Rule 60(b) does not provide
relief for purported errors of law, the court denied the creditor's
92 Id. at 773-74. See In re H.R.P. Auto Center, Inc., 130 B.R. 247, 255 (Bankr.
N.D. Ohio 1991) (refusing to reconsider order allowing a claim where debtor
waited seventeen months to request reconsideration); In re Motor Freight Express,
91 B.R. 705, 711 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1988) (stressing the importance of resolving
claims expeditiously to ensure prompt distributions to creditors); Karen-Richard
Beauty Salon, Inc. v. Fontainebleau Hotel Corp., 36 B.R. 896, 900 (S.D. Fla. 1983)
(granting reconsideration where "the record shows no evidence that any intervening rights have attached in reliance upon the earlier judgment and the court is satisfied that no actual injustice has ensued").
93 126 B.R. 613 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1991).
94 Id. at 615. But see In re Fox, 64 B.R. 148, 152 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1986) (stating
that where plan was not yet confirmed, no great prejudice to other creditors was
likely to result from reconsideration).
95 83 B.R. 539 (Bankr. N.D. Ill.), aff'd 90 B.R. 335 (N.D. Ill. 1988), rev'd on other
grounds, 890 F.2d 896 (7th Cir. 1989).
96 Id. at 541.
97 Id. See In re Costello, 136 B.R. 296, 299 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1992) (noting in
dicta that court would not reconsider an order allowing a claim based on newly
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motion to reconsider.9 8

In In re Flagstaff Foodservice Corp., 99 the bankruptcy court
adopted a more discretionary standard for determining whether
to grant a § 502(j) motion. Flagstaff involved a motion by a secured creditor, who provided financing to the debtor in possession, for reconsideration of the allowance of certain reclamation
claims. The court directed that proceeds of the debtor's receivables be used to make weekly payments of $25,000 to a fund created to pay reclamation claims. Upon realizing that it would not
be paid in full, the secured lender refused to allow the debtor to
continue to make the weekly payments to the fund and instituted
its reconsideration motion. 0 0 Noting that "the determination of
whether or not to reconsider falls upon the equitable judgment
of the court and is within the sound discretion of the court," the
court granted the motion to reconsider in part.' 0 ' The court did
not reconsider certain of the reclamation claims, however, because the secured creditor "did not advance any new allegation
0 2
of fact which would indicate manifest injustice or clear error."1
While Flagstaff may appear to favor a more liberal construcdiscovered evidence where debtor failed to establish that evidence could not have
been obtained at the time of the order).
98 Excello Press, 83 B.R. at 542. See In re Carib-Inn of San Juan Corp., 130 B.R. 6,
7 (Bankr. D.P.R. 1991) (refusing to apply Bankruptcy Rule 3008 "to 'bring the
same issue before the consideration of the Court' " in order "to circumvent the
expiration of the appeal period"); In re Motor Freight Express, 91 B.R. 705, 711
(Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1988) (maintaining that a court will not consider a claim based on
"errors of omission by counsel which are not justified by some allegations of extraordinary causation factors"); In re Monument Record Corp., 71 B.R. 853, 865
(Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1987) (refusing to reconsider an allowed claim where the moving trustee was simply requesting that the court relitigate issues already decided by
the court); In re Commodore Corp., 70 B.R. 543, 544-45 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1987)
(refusing to grant motion to reconsider where movant failed to present new evidence); In re F/S Communications Corp., 59 B.R. 824, 827 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1986)
(denying reconsideration to avoid prejudice to creditors and to promote "efficient
administration of the estate"); In re Uiterwyk Corp., 57 B.R. 166, 166 (Bankr. M.D.
Fla. 1986) (refusing reconsideration because "[c]arelesness is not synonymous with
excusable neglect"). But see In re Cadillac Wildwood Dev. Corp., 138 B.R. 854
(Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1992) (reconsidering allowed secured claim where debtor alleged that the interest charged in the loan that formed the claim's basis was usurious, and failure to reconsider and disallow the claim in part would result in windfall
to the debtor's estate); Motor Freight Express, 91 B.R. at 710 (holding that bankruptcy
courts possess the power to correct errors of law); In re Yagow, 62 B.R. 73, 78
(Bankr. D. N.D. 1986) (suggesting that reconsideration is available even where doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel are applicable to prior order).
99 56 B.R. 910 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986).
100 Id. at 913.
101 Id.
102 Id. at 917.

1634

SETON HALL LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 23:1612

tion, and, in particular, a more purely discretionary interpretation of § 502(j) and Bankruptcy Rule 3008, the vast majority of
the cases look to the grounds set forth in Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 60(b) and factors similar to those espoused in Resources Reclamation in determining whether reconsideration is warranted. Applying such standards, a court would most likely not
reconsider its prior decision either allowing or disallowing a
claim. 103
V.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

In general, a § 502(j) motion is not subject to a specific statute of limitations except to the extent that the five-year time limitation under § 1143 is applicable or where the claim was initially
allowed or disallowed after a "contest" and the grounds for reconsideration are excusable neglect, newly discovered evidence
or fraud. In the latter, rather limited, circumstances, a motion
for reconsideration is subject to the one-year time limitation set
forth in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b). Rule 60(b) also
provides the standards that a court will most likely apply in determining whether "cause" has been demonstrated for the granting
of reconsideration. Often, in applying these standards, the court
will deny reconsideration.
Where a claimant establishes cause, and is entitled to reconsideration, however, the plan confirmation process may be bereft
of finality. On the other hand, without a reasonable period for
the reconsideration of a subsequently liquidated claim, a holder
of a contingent claim may be left without any practical recourse.
To balance the respective hardships on all parties involved
in the confirmation process, an express time limit should be incorporated into § 502(j). The time limit already provided under
103 See In re Colley, 814 F.2d 1008, 1010 (5th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom., Colley v.
Nat'l Bank of Texas, 484 U.S. 898 (1987) (denying reconsideration request because
insufficient "cause" set forth pursuant to Rule 60(b)); In re H.R.P. Auto Center,

Inc., 130 B.R. 247, 255 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1991) (holding that debtor's allegation
that claim should be reconsidered because the debtor's counsel lacked authority to
enter into the stipulation that allowed the claim did not constitute grounds for reconsideration because debtor failed to present credible evidence that counsel did
not possess such authority); In re F/S Communications Corp., 59 B.R. 824, 827-28
(Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1986) (concluding that failure to note objection to claim among
bulk of papers received in case is not a justified "cause" for reconsideration of
disallowed claim); In re Uiterwyk Corp., 57 B.R. 166, 166 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1986)
(refusing reconsideration because counsel's failure to attend hearing regarding objection to claim because of distraction by another case did not comprise "excusable
neglect").
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Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) for claims that are subject
to a "contest" comprises one possible limit. In other words, a
claimant holding a contingent or unliquidated claim would be
obligated to liquidate the claim and to move for reconsideration
by the later of the confirmation date of the reorganization plan,
or one year after the initial allowance or disallowance of the
claim. This requirement would provide creditors with a reasonable period of time within which to litigate and settle the claim,
while limiting the time that other creditors must wait before the
amount of their distributions under the plan can become fixed.
Thus, a one-year time limitation would permit a chapter 11 case
to conclude without unduly interfering with a contingent claimant's right to participate in the distributions from the chapter 11
estate.
Regardless of whether it is one year, six months or some
other period of time, some express time limitation to § 502(j) is
necessary. Without any such limitation, the finality that all creditors and parties in interest seek and expect from confirmation
and consummation of a plan of reorganization may prove
illusory.

